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Exploited and persecuted, child soldiers live lives dominated by violence, fear, and 
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exclusionary bars or rigid interpretations of the particular social group ground for asylum, 
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exclusively, on the exclusionary bars and question of whether children are persecutors or 
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child soldiers face further challenges to gaining admission to the U.S. This Note argues that 
courts must recognize children as targets of persecution by groups that systematically exploit 
them as child soldiers. Recognizing children as belonging to contextually-defined, particular 
social groups for the purposes of past persecution opens the door to grants of humanitarian 
asylum thereby providing another avenue of protection for children who have suffered life-
altering persecution and exploitation.  
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[T]he rebels fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), machine guns, 
AK-47s, G3s, all the weapons they had, directly into the clearing.
But we knew we had no choice, we had to make it across the 
clearing because, as young boys, the risk of staying in town was 
greater for us than trying to escape. Young boys were immediately 
recruited, and the initials RUF were carved wherever pleased the 
rebels, with a hot bayonet. This not only meant that you were 
scarred for life but that you could never escape from them, because 
escaping with the carving of the rebels’ initials was asking 
for death . . . .
1
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 1. ISHMAEL BEAH, A LONG WAY GONE: MEMOIRS OF A BOY SOLDIER 24 (2007).
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States should not contribute to the traumatization of the child by 
washing their hands of them though the process of exclusion from 
refugee status.
2
 Ishmael Beah, the young boy running in the clearing in Sierra 
Leone, escaped the rebels that day. Yet, within the same year, the 
Sierra Leonean army forced Beah to join their forces.
3
 On that day 
Beah became one of the estimated 300,000 child soldiers involved in 
combat worldwide.
4
 For two years Beah was exploited and abused, 
though his story ends well. When Beah was fifteen UNICEF workers 
found and rescued him, beginning the long rehabilitation process.
5
Fleeing continued strife in Sierra Leone, Beah made his way to New 
York where he ultimately became an advocate for child soldiers, 
drawing much needed attention to this global crisis through his 
memoir, A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier.
6
 Brought into the public consciousness by Beah’s memoir, child 
soldiers are once again in the foreground of the public landscape. The 
case of Omar Kadhr, a young man who was only fifteen years old 
when U.S. forces captured and detained him in Afghanistan, has 
brought the child soldier debate to an intersection with the so-called 
war on terror.
7
 In 2003 Khadr “allegedly threw a grenade that killed 
a U.S. Special Forces medic”; his subsequent detention at the age of 
fifteen made him the youngest person the U.S. has or is currently 
detaining at Guantanamo.
8
 The U.N. officially stated that Khadr 
should not be prosecuted because his family, active in al-Qaeda, 
indoctrinated the young man into their belief system.
9
 As of February 
2010 and over the protests of organizations such as Human Rights 
Watch and multiple amicus briefs, reports indicate the Obama 
Administration will proceed with a military tribunal trial of Khadr in 
July 2010.
10
 Should the tribunal proceed, it will set negative 
 2. Geoff Gilbert, Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, in
REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 425, 473 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/419dba514.html. 
 3. See BEAH, supra note 1, at 101-13. 
 4. UNICEF, Factsheet: Child Soldiers, www.unicef.org/emerg/files/childsoldiers.pdf 
(last visited July 2, 2011). 
 5. See BEAH, supra note 1, at 127-78.
 6. Id. at 209-17.
 7. See Peter Finn, Former Boy Soldier, Youngest Guantanamo Detainee, Heads 
Toward Military Tribunal, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/09/AR2010020904020.html.
 8. Id.; see also Human Rights Watch, US: Improve Treatment of Children in Armed 
Conflict (June 6, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/06/06/us-improve-treatment-children- 
armed-conflict (noting that there are other child soldiers detained at Guantanamo).
 9. Finn, supra note 7.
 10. Id.; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 8; Brief for Nat’l Inst. Of Military 
Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Khadr v. Gates, No. 07-11J6 (D.C. Cir. 
June 16, 2008).
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precedent for the future treatment of child soldiers under U.S. law, 
treating them as criminals rather than victims of conflict.  
 Stories such as Ishmael Beah’s brought the plight of child soldiers 
into the international spotlight. Khadr’s story proves the crisis 
continues. Yet, answers as to how to best address or even legally 
define child soldiers remain elusive. Asylum law has only a part to 
play on the international stage as nations attempt to address this 
crisis. However, as currently applied, asylum law “itself rather than 
access to it is the main site of discrimination” against child soldiers.
11
Courts fail to recognize that children are targeted for exploitation 
because they are children.
12
 This failure leads to the corollary failure 
to recognize children as belonging to a particular social group for the 
purpose of past persecution, which forecloses to children the 
possibility of humanitarian asylum.
13
 To protect children whose lives 
have been derailed by war, asylum law must evolve to recognize that 
former child soldiers suffered past persecution because of their 
membership in a particular social group. This Note proposes a 
general definition for that group: children living in countries where 
groups regularly conscript child soldiers, who were separated from 
their families, by force or circumstance, and were in their late preteen 
to midteen years at the time of conscription. Before embarking on a 
more in-depth discussion of the proposed particular social group, one 
must understand why groups target children, as well as relevant 
asylum law. 
I.  THE PROFILE OF A CHILD SOLDIER
 Definitions of child soldier differ in detail but scholars agree on a 
broad construction: a child under the age of eighteen, either male or 
female, who is forced into service, be it military or supportive work, 
for government or rebel groups is a child soldier.
14
 UNICEF provides 
greater specificity, defining a child soldier as: 
any child – boy or girl – under 18 years of age, who is part of any 
kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any 
 11. Jennifer C. Everett, The Battle Continues: Fighting for a More Child-Sensitive 
Approach to Asylum for Child Soldiers, 21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 285, 313 (2009) (quoting 
Jacqueline Bhabha, Demography and Rights: Women, Children and Access to Asylum, 16 
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 227, 243 (2004)).
 12. See, e.g., Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting a former 
child soldier’s claim); see also Everett, supra note 11, at 292 (supporting the argument that 
groups target children because they are children).
 13. See, e.g., Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 171-74.
 14. See UNICEF, supra note 4; COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS,
CHILD SOLDIERS: GLOBAL REPORT 2008 SUMMARY 9 [hereinafter COALITION], available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/12/11/child-soldiers-global-report-2008 (defining child 
soldiers as “any person below the age of 18 who is a member of or attached to government 
armed forces or any other regular or irregular armed force or armed political group, 
whether or not an armed conflict exists.”).
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capacity, including, but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers, 
and anyone accompanying such groups other than family 
members. It includes girls and boys recruited for forced sexual 
purposes and/or forced marriage. The definition, therefore, does 
not only refer to a child who is carrying, or has carried, weapons.
15
Accurate data are hard to obtain, so estimates of the number of child 
soldiers are imperfect, but most organizations agree there are 
approximately 300,000 child soldiers worldwide.
16
 While numbers 
and definitions may differ, the grim reality is that the stories of most 
child soldiers do not end with rehabilitation and a chance at a new 
life free from threats of reconscription, abuse, or death.
17
 Those who 
even have the resources or opportunity to flee the country of their 
persecution face asylum law, which is profoundly ill-equipped to 
address their needs and the particular form of persecution child 
soldiers suffer.
18
 Children continue to lose their childhood and lives, 
and U.S. law has yet to act to abate their suffering through the 
informed application of asylum law to child soldiers.
19
 Child soldiers fit a profile. First, the paradigmatic child soldier 
has been abducted, orphaned, or otherwise separated from his or her 
family.
20
 Those children who voluntarily join forces do so because 
poverty and alienation from family force them to join simply for food 
and as a form of security, thereby undermining the voluntary nature 
of such action.
21
 Second, though the average age of child soldiers 
continues to decrease,
22
 a paradigmatic child soldier is in his or her 
late preteen to midteenage years with the average being between 
twelve and thirteen years old.
23
 Groups target children in this age 
range because younger children are unable to carry weapons or 
 15. UNICEF, supra note 4.
 16. Id. But see COALITION, supra note 14, at 10 (placing the numbers of child soldiers 
anywhere from a few tens of thousands to 300,000).
 17. See Everett, supra note 11, at 288; Mary-Hunter Morris, Babies and Bathwater: 
Seeking an Appropriate Standard of Review for the Asylum Applications of Former Child 
Soldiers, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 281, 283-84 (2008); Benjamin Ruesch, Open the Golden 
Door: Practical Solutions for Child-Soldiers Seeking Asylum in the United States, 29 U. LA
VERNE L. REV. 184, 194 (2008).
 18. See Everett, supra note 11, at 288-90. 
 19. See id. 
20. See P.W. SINGER, CHILDREN AT WAR 15, 58 (2005). Statistics show that the 
Revolutionary United Front, a rebel group in Sierra Leone, abducted approximately eighty 
percent of the child soldiers in their forces. Id. at 15; see also Human Rights Watch, Facts 
About Child Soldiers, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/03/facts-about-child-soldiers 
(last visited July 2, 2011). 
 21. SINGER, supra note 20, at 62; MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS 25 (2006). 
 22. WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 7. In Uganda, where child soldiers used to all be 
teenagers, the average age has decreased to under thirteen years old. “‘Small-boy units’” in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone are known for recruiting children under the age of twelve. Id.; see 
also SINGER, supra note 20, at 15, 29 (noting that the Revolutionary Armed Forces used 
children as young as seven as child soldiers and providing an average age). 
 23. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 15, 29 (providing an average age.); see also 
WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 7.
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perform heavy labor, while older teenagers, though physically more 
capable, may be less impressionable.
24
 Though the paradigm 
inevitably excludes some child soldiers, unifying the characteristics 
delineates which children are at risk of conscription. Children who fit 
this profile and who are living in conflict zones where groups are 
known to exploit children as soldiers are at an increased risk of being 
forcibly conscripted.
25
 Groups targeting children do so deliberately—there is a method to 
their tactics. More than just a desire to increase ranks or 
opportunistic exploitation, “[c]hild soldiering is part of a warfare 
strategy that is shared across lines of combat and war zones around 
the globe.”
26
 An easily identifiable policy of such groups is that of the 
abduction of vulnerable children. Some groups have a policy of taking 
all children they come across, while others direct the systematic 
raiding of schools, villages, and markets.
27
 Regardless of the nature of 
the policy, rebel groups and governments make tactical decisions to 
abduct children who fit their recruitment profiles as part of a 
“meticulously planned [and ruthless] process.”
28
 Groups target children because of characteristics inextricably 
linked to their being children—not simply out of a need to bolster 
their forces.
29
 Children are more obedient than adults, as well as 
more psychologically vulnerable.
30
 Children are, to a military eye, 
easy-keepers; they make “fewer demands than adults, and thus more 
easily serve at the bottom of military hierarchy.”
31
 Children are 
cheap, rarely demanding pay for their service.
32
 Groups also target 
children for their ability to elude capture, either because of their 
smaller size or the fact that victims do not always suspect children to 
be soldiers.
33
 Lastly, and perhaps most disturbing, groups know 
children are “in such bountiful supply” that they are expendable 
soldiers as compared to trained adults;
34
 another child will always be 
available to abduct and exploit. These characteristics make children 
appealing to those who would misuse them, making their 
conscription anything but a “last resort.”
35
 Rather, children are a 
 24. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 20, at 58; WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 34-36.
 25. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 20. 
 26. ALCINDA HONWANA, CHILD SOLDIERS IN AFRICA 44 (2006).
 27. SINGER, supra note 20, at 58-60; WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 37-40.
 28. SINGER, supra note 20, at 58.
 29. See WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 37-40.
 30. Jennifer R. Silva, Child Soldiers: A Call to the International Community to Protect 
Children From War, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 681, 688 (2008).
 31. Everett, supra note 11, at 292. 
 32. SINGER, supra note 20, at 55.
 33. See WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 36.
 34. Id. at 37.
 35. Id. at 2.
658 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:653 
“convenient[,] cheap,”
36
 and easily exploitable group who appeal to 
their persecutors because of characteristics intrinsic to their 
being children.
37
 After conscription, children suffer particular and long lasting 
harms.
38
 Children enter a new world as they become child soldiers, a 
“social world [with] a culture of violence.”
39
 Groups indoctrinate 
children by forcing them to kill or watch others kill strangers and 
people close to them.
40
 Children endure torture, physical abuse, and 
threats of death for disobedience.
41
 Some groups have even forced 
children to engage in cannibalism as part of the indoctrination 
process.
42
 Many groups force children to take various drugs inducing 
addiction, frequently as an attempt to “steel children for combat.”
43
 In 
addition to abusive indoctrination techniques, child soldiers suffer 
the dangers and atrocities of war as both participants and victims.
44
Often, groups give children the most dangerous tasks, such as 
searching for landmines, because they are worth less to the group 
than trained adults.
45
 Many children also suffer sexual assault and 
rape.
46
 Studies indicate that “exposure to extreme atrocities has a 
more lasting and impressionable effect on child soldiers compared to 
adults.”
47
 Many child soldiers “suffer flashbacks, nightmares, sleep 
disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder . . . .”
48
 A child soldier’s 
suffering is profound and inescapable. The unifying characteristics of 
children at risk of conscription, the motivations of groups that target 
children, and the severity of harm children suffer all help support 
and delimit child soldiers’ claims.
49
 Before specifically discussing the 
influence of each of these factors, however, it is necessary to provide 
an overview of the purpose and substance of asylum law. 
 36. Id.
 37. See Everett, supra note 11, at 292.
 38. For a detailed discussion of the abuses child soldiers suffer, see WESSELLS, supra
note 21, at 57-84, and SINGER, supra note 20, at 70-93.
 39. WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 57.
 40. SINGER, supra note 20, at 74; WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 59.
 41. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 71-72.
 42. Id. at 74.
 43. WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 76; see also Everett, supra note 11, at 297 
(“[C]hildren are physically abused or given drugs, deliberately brutalized in order ‘to
harden and numb them into becoming more ruthless soldiers.’ ”).
 44. Nienke Grossman, Rehabilitation or Revenge: Prosecuting Child Soldiers for 
Human Rights Violations, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 323, 327 (2007).
 45. WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 37.
 46. See Grossman, supra note 44, at 327-28.
 47. Everett, supra note 11, at 293.
 48. Grossman, supra note 44, at 328.
 49. See Everett, supra note 11, at 319; Ruesch, supra note 17, at 194-96 (discussing 
the influence of each of these factors on the outcome of Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 
(3d Cir. 2003)). 
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II.  ASYLUM LAW OVERVIEW
A.  Origins and Definitions 
 Asylum law is, at its core, a humanitarian endeavor.
50
 It finds its 
foundations in attempts to address the suffering of persons displaced 
and persecuted during World War I and World War II.
51
 Drawing 
from the original creation of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees
52
 and the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees,
53
 the U.S. ultimately enacted refugee protections in their 
current form in the Refugee Act of 1980.
54
 The comprehensive 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) now governs asylum and 
withholding of deportation claims. Under the INA a “refugee” is: 
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality 
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any 
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is 
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to 
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.
55
 To qualify for relief under the INA, an applicant must satisfy 
multiple prongs imbedded within the definition of a refugee. The 
statute articulates five grounds upon which a person can apply for 
asylum, namely persecution based on: race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
56
 Per 
the language of the statute, the applicant must establish a nexus 
between one of these five enumerated grounds found in the statute 
and the persecution suffered.
57
 Stated otherwise, the persecution 
must have occurred “on account of” one of the enumerated grounds.
58
The Supreme Court raised the standard of this prong by requiring 
the applicant prove, through either direct or circumstantial evidence, 
her alleged persecutor’s intent/motive to persecute her based on one 
 50. See KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 19 (3d ed. 2007).
 51. See id.
 52. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, An Introduction to the 
International Protection of Refugees 6-7 (June 1992), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/ 
3cce9a244.pdf.
 53. See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 34.
 54. Id. at 73-74 (describing the origin of the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 
§ 207(c)(1), 94 Stat. 102, 103 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982))).
 55. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
 56. Id.
 57. MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 291.
 58. See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 480 (1992).
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of the five enumerated grounds.
59
 For child soldiers applying for 
asylum, the particular social group ground is of greatest import 
because it is the category under which children are most likely to 
make claims.
60
 Unfortunately, this nexus requirement is, as will be 
discussed, particularly problematic for child soldiers.
61
 In addition to proving a nexus, the asylum applicant must also 
establish that he or she has been persecuted as the term is 
understood in asylum law.
62
 The statute recognizes either past 
persecution or a “well-founded fear of persecution” as providing a 
basis for the applicant’s claim for asylum.
63
 If the applicant 
establishes past persecution, doing so raises a rebuttable 
presumption of a fear of future persecution.
64
 Lacking a specific 
definition, the general definition of persecution is “a threat to the life 
or freedom of those who differ from the persecutor in a way regarded 
as offensive, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon such 
persons.”
65
 Importantly, the persecution suffered must be at the 
hands of “the government of a country or by members of an 
organization that the government is unable or unwilling to control.”
66
Though most applicants must establish a fear of future persecution,
67
an applicant can be granted asylum based on severe past persecution 
alone, referred to as a “humanitarian grant.”
68
 The possibility of a 
humanitarian grant of asylum will be addressed in subsequent 
discussion of child soldier asylum applicants.  
 In certain circumstances, U.S. law excludes a person who 
otherwise qualifies for asylum or withholding of deportation. The two 
exclusionary provisions of greatest import to child soldiers are Article 
1.F of the Refugee Convention and the antiterrorism bar created by 
 59. Id. at 483 (Denying applicant’s claim based on political opinion, the Court held 
that Elias-Zacarias had to show that the guerrillas targeted him for his political opinion, 
rather than showing that the guerrillas were motivated by political aims. Because 
applicant did not establish this nexus between the persecutor’s actions and the victim’s 
political opinion, the Court denied his asylum application.).
 60. Everett, supra note 11, at 320.
 61. See, e.g., Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157,183 (3d Cir. 2003) (denying 
applicant’s particular social group for past persecution).
 62. See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 229.
 63. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2010).
 64. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).
 65. 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 1006 (2010).
 66. Id. § 1007.
 67. MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 245.
 68.  Ruesch, supra note 17, at 194; For regulatory language, see 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b): 
(iii) Grant in the absence of well-founded fear of persecution. An applicant 
described in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section who is not barred from a grant of 
asylum under paragraph (c) of this section, may be granted asylum, in the 
exercise of the decision-maker’s discretion, if: 
(A) The applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons for being unwilling or 
unable to return to the country arising out of the severity of the past persecution . . . . 
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enactment of the PATRIOT and REAL ID Acts of 2001 and 2005, 
generally referred to as the “persecutor bar” and “material support 
bar,” respectively.
69
 The motivating assumption of these exclusionary 
bars is that some people are “unworthy of protection, because of 
serious human rights or criminal law violations, or because they pose 
a risk to the host country.”
70
 Article 1.F of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention provided the foundation for the U.S. persecutor bar, now 
embodied within the definition of a refugee in INA § 101(a)(42), 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42):
71
 “The term ‘refugee’ does not include any 
person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the 
persecution of any person on account of race, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
72
 INA §
208(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A) mirrors this language and 
provides further grounds for exclusion: 
(ii) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community 
of the United States; 
(iii) there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has 
committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States 
prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States; 
(iv) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a 
danger to the security of the United States . . . .
73
Lastly, the terrorism bar of INA § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) 
bars admission to anyone who “has engaged in a terrorist activity”
74
or “affords material support”
75
 to terrorists. Because of the statute’s 
broad conception of terrorism
76
 and the absence of a duress exception 
for either exclusionary provision, child soldiers are at risk of 
exclusion under both bars.
77
 The majority of scholarship on child 
 69. Kathryn White, A Chance for Redemption: Revising the “Persecutor Bar” and 
“Material Support Bar” in the Case of Child Soldiers, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 191, 195-
97, 202-03 (2010).
 70. MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 831.
 71. Id. at 833. Article 1.F provides that: 
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to 
whom there are serious reasons for considering that: 
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity . . . 
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge 
prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; 
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations.  
Id.
 72. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006).
 73. Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv).
 74. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I).
 75. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). 
 76. See White, supra note 69, at 203-04.
 77. See id. at 193-96, 201, 206-07.
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soldiers under asylum law focuses on the effect of the persecutor and 
material support bars on child soldier applicants.
78
B.  A Maelstrom of Precedent: Particular Social Group Case Law 
 Particular social group precedent is nothing if not a muddled and 
inconsistent area of asylum law.
79
 Because the INA does not provide 
a definition of particular social group, courts have been left to do so 
for themselves and the results have been less than satisfactory.
80
Despite its inconsistencies, scholars note that more asylum 
applicants now attempt to utilize membership in a particular social 
group as grounds for their claims.
81
 Recognizing this as an 
opportunity, these scholars argue “a measured response to the 
phenomenon of social group persecution may help ensure the 
continuing viability of the refugee definition in the twenty-first 
century.”
82
 Restructuring how courts address child soldiers’ 
particular social group claims provides an opportunity to strengthen 
this important area of asylum law as it moves into the twenty-
first century. 
 In the area of particular social group case law, all roads lead back 
to the 1985 case Matter of Acosta.
83
 Acosta was a member of a taxi 
drivers’ cooperative (COTAXI) which became the target of threats 
and violence by anti-government guerilla forces in El Salvador.
84
Ultimately, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Acosta’s 
claim, but in doing so it articulated a foundational precept of 
particular social group theory: 
Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, we interpret the phrase 
“persecution on account of membership in a particular social 
group” to mean persecution that is directed toward an individual 
who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a 
common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic 
might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in 
some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as 
former military leadership or land ownership. The particular kind 
of group characteristic that will qualify under this construction 
remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, 
whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it 
must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or 
 78. See, e.g., Ruesch, supra note 17.
 79. See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2000).
 80. Id.
 81. See, e.g., MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 619.
 82. Id.
 83. Id. at 620 (“[T]he Board articulated in his case an expansive and remarkably 
resilient definition of social group that has resulted in the granting of asylum to members 
of a great variety of human collectives . . . .”).
 84. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 216-17 (B.I.A. 1985), vacated on other 
grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
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should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their 
individual identities or consciences.
85
On its face, there is nothing in this conception of particular social 
group that expressly excludes age-based groups from recognition as 
particular social groups. Rather, courts have interpreted this 
foundational definition with a reluctance to recognize age-based 
particular social groups.
86
 While courts have been reluctant to recognize age-based 
particular social groups claims, there are seeds of change that could 
help asylum law grow to recognize carefully considered age-based 
groups, such as child soldiers. In Gao v. Gonzales, the Second Circuit 
recognized that the breadth of a particular social group is not 
necessarily determinative of or fatal to its validity.
87
 Rather, the 
category can “encompass groups whose main shared trait is a 
common one, such as gender, at least so long as the group shares a 
further characteristic that is identifiable to would-be persecutors and 
is immutable or fundamental.”
88
 The court goes on to state that other 
circuits have stood by the broad conception in Acosta of particular 
social group, “however populous” the group may be, so long as the 
members are “persecuted because of shared characteristics.”
89
 Thus, 
rather than being per se improper because of its breadth, the Second 
Circuit recognizes that particular social groups based on broadly 
shared characteristics can be valid subject to certain qualifications. 
 Applicants proposing broad particular social groups must satisfy 
certain requirements. In effect, the Second Circuit recognizes a plus-
factor requirement when an applicant bases her particular social 
group on a broad characteristic such as gender or age.
90
 The Second 
Circuit reiterated that courts should “interpret ‘particular social 
group’ broadly . . . while interpreting ‘on account of’ strictly (such 
that an applicant must prove that these characteristics are a central 
reason why she has been, or may be, targeted for persecution).”
91
Importantly, the court goes on to state that in situations where, 
because the group is broad, the applicant has a higher burden to 
prove nexus, general country conditions may reduce that burden.
92
 85. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
 86. See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting recognition of 
race, religion, nationality and political opinion as particular social group traits).
 87. 440 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2006).
 88. Id. at 64.
 89. Id. at 67.
 90. Id. at 69 (The court noted that in a previous case it stated that “broadly-based 
characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with 
membership in a particular group.” (quoting Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991))).
 91. Id. at 68.
 92. Id. at 70 n.5 (“To the extent that the social group of which the petitioner claims to 
be a member is exceptionally broad, the need for the individual to prove that he, in 
particular, reasonably fears being persecuted is certainly greater. This can be done either 
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Thus, previous asylum applicants basing group memberships on age 
or other broad characteristics failed not because broad-based groups 
are per se improper, but rather because they failed to sufficiently 
establish a nexus.
93
 Other circuits recognize what seems intuitive: the very fact that a 
child suffers persecution as a child can strengthen his or her claim. 
The Third Circuit recognized this concept in Lukwago v. Ashcroft,
which will subsequently be discussed in detail.
94
 The Ninth Circuit 
considered a case in which a young Russian boy suffered persecution 
at the hands of the public and the government because of his 
developmental disability.
95
 Though Evgueni’s mother was the 
applicant, the court considered the persecution Evgueni suffered 
stating that the fact “[t]hat Evgueni was subjected to such harsh 
conditions at a tender age strengthens his claim.”
96
 Ultimately, the 
Ninth Circuit granted asylum to Evgueni and his family.
97
 By 
recognizing that persecution can be worse because the victim is a 
child, the Ninth Circuit further opened the door for applicants such 
as child soldiers to strengthen their claims of past persecution. 
 Past legislative action also sets positive precedent for the future of 
child soldiers’ claims. Congress amended the INA in 1996 to include 
victims of China’s coercive population control policies.
98
 In a separate 
1999 case, the BIA denied asylum to a Guatemalan woman who 
suffered brutal domestic violence.
99
 The BIA did not recognize the 
applicant’s particular social group and found her claim lacked the 
required nexus.
100
 Rejecting the outcome of this case, Attorney 
General Janet Reno took legislative action to recognize “gender . . . 
[as] a sufficiently unifying characteristic” for the purpose of gender-
based particular social group analysis.
101
 The Department of 
Homeland Security has yet to finalize the rule,
102
 but the importance 
by showing that a significant portion of even the very broad group will be persecuted, or by 
establishing that there are good reasons for thinking that the particular alien will be 
singled out for persecution. The need for such proof will depend, of course, on the nature as 
well as the breadth of the social group, e.g., it may be readily assumed in the circumstances 
of a particular country that virtually every individual in a racial or ethnic group may 
reasonably fear future persecution, even though the group is very large.”).
 93. Id. at 69.
 94. 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003) (considering age as part of asylum applicant’s group 
membership in claims of past and future persecution).
 95. Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005).
 96. Id. at 1193.
 97. Id. at 1196.
 98. Ruesch, supra note 17, at 215-16.
 99. In re R–A–, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999).
 100. Id. at 917 (“Initially, we find that ‘Guatemalan women who have been involved 
intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under 
male domination’ is not a particular social group.”), 920.
 101. Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 68 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006); see also MUSALO ET AL., supra 
note 50, at 814.
 102. MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 814.
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of the rule for child soldier claims lies not in its finalization, but 
rather its very proposal. Its proposal evinces a potential avenue for 
reform of the law to bring it in line with the needs of certain 
applicants where the courts fail to address those needs.
103
 Taken 
alongside the potential for developments in particular social group 
precedent, the possibility of legislative reform of the INA plays a role 
in bringing U.S. asylum law regarding child soldiers into the twenty-
first century. 
C.  Limited and Mixed: Child Soldiers in Asylum Law 
 Whereas the case law defining particular social group is 
voluminous but unclear, the case law on child soldier asylum claims 
is sparse and incomplete. Two cases constitute the primary available 
precedent in this critical and highly charged area of law: Lukwago v. 
Ashcroft
104
 in the Third Circuit and Bah v. Ashcroft
105
 in the Fifth 
Circuit. Analysis of these cases reveals the two problems plaguing 
child soldier asylum applicants: the failure of courts to recognize the 
applicant’s particular social group for past persecution and the 
application of the persecutor bar to exclude child soldiers.  
 Lukwago is both a success and a failure for those advocating 
increased protections for child soldiers in the asylum process. 
Bernard Lukwago, a young man from Uganda, made claims for 
asylum and withholding of removal under both the INA and the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT).
106
 Lukwago identified himself as 
part of two particular social groups. He identified the first group, 
used for the past persecution prong of the INA, as “children from 
Northern Uganda who are abducted and enslaved by the LRA [Lord’s 
Resistance Army] and oppose their involuntary servitude.”
107
Lukwago then identified a second particular social group, for the 
purpose of the future persecution prong, which he defined as “former 
child soldiers who have escaped LRA enslavement.”
108
Lukwago is a 
success because the court recognized child soldiers as a group for the 
purpose of future persecution. However, the case is also a failure for 
those arguing on behalf of child soldiers, because the court failed to 
recognize Lukwago’s proposed social group for the purpose of past 
persecution.
109
 This distinction is critical and is particularly 
problematic for child soldier applicants, as will be subsequently 
discussed. Bearing this distinction in mind, it is important to have a 
 103. Ruesch, supra note 17, at 215-17.
 104.  329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003).
 105.  341 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003).
 106. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 163-64.
 107. Id. at 167.
 108. Id.
 109. Id. at 171-74.
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thorough understanding of Lukwago as it constitutes the limited 
precedent available for child soldier asylum cases. 
 Lukwago faced repeated denials of his claims until reaching the 
Third Circuit.
110
 Finding Lukwago’s testimony lacking in credibility, 
the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his INA claims but granted 
withholding of removal under CAT.
111
 The BIA then reversed the IJ’s 
finding that Lukwago’s testimony lacked credibility but still denied 
all of Lukwago’s claims and ordered his deportation.
112
 It was the BIA 
that explicitly questioned the nexus between Lukwago’s particular 
social group for past persecution and the motives of his persecutors.
113
 The great disappointment of Lukwago is the Third Circuit’s 
failure to recognize Lukwago’s particular social group for the purpose 
of past persecution. Recall that Lukwago characterized this group as 
“children from Northern Uganda who are abducted and enslaved by 
the LRA and oppose their involuntary servitude.”
114
 The court looked 
at this group and saw a tautology: a group that, rather than 
preexisting its persecution, was defined by the persecution its 
members suffered.
115
 This tautology, the court added, defeats the 
nexus requirement as “the shared experience of enduring past 
persecution . . . does not support defining a ‘particular social group’
for past persecution” because doing so precludes membership in the 
group being the persecutor’s motivation for targeting the victim.
116
Where the court fails is not in its valid concern with a group being 
defined by the persecution it suffers for the purpose of past 
persecution. Rather, the court failed to accurately interpret the 
characteristics of Lukwago’s particular social group and therein 
failed to recognize that groups target children because they 
are children.
117
 One can attribute part of the court’s failure to recognize 
Lukwago’s particular social group to the language Lukwago used to 
construct it, language that bolsters the court’s concern with 
 110. Id. at 165-66.
 111. Id. at 165.
 112. Id. at 165-66. The BIA recognized the effect of Lukwago’s juvenile status on his 
testimony, stating that “it would be unreasonable to expect a high degree of detail 
regarding battle conditions from a young man who was only 15 years old . . . and who had 
been assessed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.” Id. at 165 (quoting Brief of 
Petitioner at AV1 at 6, Lukwago v. Ashcroft, No. 02-1812 (3d Cir. 2002).
 113. Id. at 171-72.
 114. Id. at 167.
 115. Id. at 172.
 116. Id.
 117. See Everett, supra note 11, at 292 (supporting the argument that groups target 
children because they are children).
2011]  LOST IN DOCTRINE 667 
tautology.
118
 Nevertheless, the court also based its rejection of 
Lukwago’s particular social group and failure to find nexus on two 
flawed principles. First, the court misconstrued the nature of age as a 
basis for a particular social group claim. In one breath, the court 
recognized that “[c]hildren share many general characteristics, such 
as innocence, immaturity, and impressionability,”
119
 characteristics 
which could serve to define a particular social group. Yet, in its next 
breath, the court characterizes age-based groups as overly broad and 
insufficiently immutable as “age changes over time.”
120
 Second, the 
court used the fact that the LRA harms civilians of all ages to 
rationalize rejecting Lukwago’s argument that he was targeted for 
persecution on protected grounds.
121
 By combining these flawed 
rationales, the court was able to reject Lukwago’s particular social 
group for past persecution and thereby find his claim lacking 
a nexus.
122
 Hardly unique to Lukwago’s case, courts repeatedly refer to a 
child’s inevitable capacity to “age-out” of being a child as negatively 
impacting their claims. Aging out twists the Acosta immutability 
requirement into a death knell for a child’s asylum claim.
123
 One need 
not look to asylum case law for the proposition that children will 
inevitably grow up and cease to be children. However, when a court 
rejects a child’s particular social group as untenable because that 
child will one day be an adult is to miss the forest for the trees. If a 
child was targeted for persecution because she was a child, the fact 
that she will one day be an adult matters little to determining why 
she suffered past persecution. While this fact may bear on the risk of 
future persecution, courts, like the Third Circuit, are wrong to deny a 
child’s claim based on the fact that all children grow up.
124
 The second flaw of the Third Circuit’s decision rests in its 
interpretation of an evidentiary issue. The court uses the fact that 
the LRA “persecutes civilians regardless of age” to support its finding 
that the group could not have targeted Lukwago because of his 
 118. The language Lukwago chose—“children from Northern Uganda who are abducted 
and enslaved by the LRA and oppose their involuntary servitude”—clearly uses the 
persecution Lukwago suffered to define the group. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 167.
 119. Id. at 171.
 120. Id.
 121. Id. at 172-73.
 122. Id. at 171-73.
 123. See Flores-Cruz v. Holder, 325 F. App’x 512, 514 (9th Cir. 2009) (Herein, the court 
looked to the fact that children grow up to justify rejecting the applicants claim as part of 
the particular social group of Honduran street children.); accord, Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 
F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 2005); Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 171.
 124. See Laura P. Wexler, Street Children and U.S. Immigration Law: What Should Be 
Done?, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 545, 563 (2008) (“The reality that children will become adults 
does not warrant ignoring their needs while they are children.”).
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youth.
125
 Finding this to be supported by the evidence, the Third 
Circuit then upheld the BIA’s ultimate conclusion that the LRA 
targeted Lukwago only to bolster its forces.
126
 The flaw of this finding 
is that though all civilians are at risk from the LRA, the LRA does 
not target all civilians for use as soldiers—evidence of which was 
available to the court.
127
 There is a difference between terrorizing 
populations, killing and raping men and women and the forced 
conscription of children for service as child soldiers. Both tactics are 
atrocious examples of the LRA’s capacity for harm. Yet, the fact that 
adults suffer a distinct harm at the hands of the LRA does not defeat 
the reality that the group systematically targets and exploits 
children as child soldiers.
128
 Outside of the court’s failing to recognize Lukwago’s membership 
in a particular social group, Lukwago does provide some positive 
precedent for future child soldier applicants. Importantly, the Third 
Circuit recognized the connection between Lukwago’s youth and the 
severity of his persecution. In its evaluation of whether Lukwago 
suffered persecution, the court drew attention to the fact that 
Lukwago “was subjected to all of this physical and psychological 
abuse as a mere 15 year old boy.”
129
 Though this statement is dicta, it 
is also a positive recognition of the fact that children suffer 
persecution as children and that fact bears on the severity of their 
suffering. The court goes on to say that “[t]here could be no question 
that the LRA’s treatment of Lukwago ‘constitute[d] a real threat to 
[his] life or freedom,’ ”
130
 a finding which supports future applicants 
in establishing persecution. Of particular importance for future 
applicants trying to establish eligibility for humanitarian asylum, the 
court also characterizes Lukwago’s persecution as “atrocious and 
severe.”
131
 Doing so, the court brings Lukwago’s case into line with 
Matter of Chen, the definitive case regarding humanitarian 
asylum.
132
 By characterizing Lukwago’s persecution as atrocious and 
severe, as well as recognizing the increased impact persecution has 
on children, the Third Circuit set some positive precedent for  
future applicants. 
 The Third Circuit’s rejection of Lukwago’s particular social group 
for the purpose of past persecution, however, was profound in its 
 125. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 172-73.
 126. Id.
 127. See id.
 128. Everett, supra note 11, at 323 (“While child soldiers and adults are equally 
recruited, that should not undermine the fact that child soldiers are particularly targeted 
and persecuted because of their age and vulnerability.”).
 129. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 168 (emphasis added).
 130. Id. (quoting Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001)).
 131. Id. at 174.
 132. Id. at 173-74.
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detrimental impact. Though it found his suffering—having to watch 
the torture and killing of others, being beaten and threatened with 
death, watching his parents murdered, and being forced to kill his 
friend
133
—to be “atrocious and severe,”
134
 the court did not grant 
humanitarian asylum to Lukwago. It could not do so because it had 
previously rejected the foundations of Lukwago’s particular social 
group as insufficiently immutable and unique.
135
 Lacking a nexus 
between the profound persecution Lukwago suffered and his 
persecutor’s intentions, humanitarian asylum was unavailable no 
matter how severe and atrocious the persecution.
136
 The only option 
left to Lukwago was to prove a fear of future persecution based on his 
past experience as a child soldier—a reality he was able to establish 
and which the court accepted.
137
 Thus, while Lukwago found a 
positive outcome, the case set negative precedent for child soldier 
applicants by failing to recognize that children are targeted as 
children and that age, when appropriately characterized, can play a 
role in defining a particular social group.  
 Bah, a 2003 case out of the Fifth Circuit, addressed the issue of 
the application of the persecutor bar to child soldiers.
138
 While the 
inapplicability of such exclusionary bars to child soldiers is not the 
focus of this paper, it is important to understand Bah, as it is one of a 
very limited number of child soldier cases that carry precedential 
value. Amadu Bah was a child soldier in Sierra Leone.
139
 After seeing 
his family brutally murdered, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
forced Bah to join their cause.
140
 The RUF started Bah on cocaine and 
forced him to kill and mutilate innocent people.
141
 Though he tried to 
escape multiple times, it was not until 1997, two years after he had 
been abducted by the RUF, that Bah escaped and made his way to 
the United States.
142
 It was at that point that his struggle with the 




 Bah suffered what most scholars writing on child soldiers and 
asylum rail against: exclusion from asylum as a persecutor. Bah 
made claims under the INA for asylum and withholding of removal, 
as well as withholding of removal and deferral of removal under the 
 133. Id. at 164.
 134. Id. at 174.
 135. Id. at 171-73.
 136. Id. at 174.
 137. Id. at 174-83.
 138.  341 F.3d 348 (2003).
 139. Id. at 349.
 140. Id.
 141. Id. at 350.
 142. Id.
 143. Id. at 350 n.1.
 144.  Id. at 350.
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CAT.
145
 Both the IJ and the BIA denied Bah’s claims based on 
statutory persecutor bars in place under the INA and CAT.
146
 On 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered the application of the INA 
persecutor bar and whether Bah was entitled to deferral of removal 
under CAT.
147
 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit denied both claims.
148
 The Fifth Circuit proved unwilling to consider the circumstances 
of the acts of persecution Bah engaged in as a child soldier. The INA 
persecutor bar, as stated earlier, denies asylum and withholding of 
removal to people who persecuted others on account of one of the five 
enumerated grounds.
149
 Bah argued against application of the bar by 
stating that he only committed the persecutory acts because of his 
“forced recruitment, [as such] he did not engage in political 
persecution because he did not share the RUF’s intent of political 
persecution.”
150
 Looking to the plain language of the statute, the Fifth 
Circuit rejected Bah’s argument, finding personal motivation of the 
applicant to be irrelevant.
151
 Thus, the Court upheld the IJ and BIA’s 
rulings that Bah was ineligible for asylum as a persecutor under the 
persecutor bar. As it was not raised on appeal, Bah provides no 
assistance on the issue of child soldiers and delimiting possible 
particular social groups. Rather, Bah stands only as a failure of 
asylum law to protect child soldiers.
152
III.  AN INCOMPLETE DISCUSSION: SCHOLARSHIP ON CHILD SOLDIERS
 Though there is very little case law regarding child soldiers as 
asylum applicants, there is no similar dearth of scholarship on the 
challenges children face under U.S. asylum law. Nevertheless, the 
discussion is incomplete. The vast majority of the literature focuses 
on the effect of exclusionary bars on child soldier applicants, 
undoubtedly an important issue, but not the only challenge a child 
soldier applicant will face.
153
 Though scholars note that children may 
have suffered past persecution sufficient to warrant a grant of 
humanitarian asylum, they do so in passing,
154
 or predicate the grant 
 145. Id.
 146. Id.
 147. Id. at 351.
 148. Id. at 351-52.
 149. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (2006).
 150. Bah, 341 F.3d at 351.
 151. Id.
 152. See Morris, supra note 17, at 290 (Morris discusses the application of the Fifth 
Circuit’s rationale to similar statutory bars: “Should other Circuits follow the reasoning of 
the Fifth Circuit in analyzing the material support bar [or the persecutor of the INA], 
former child soldiers, despite having been egregiously victimized by extreme physical and 
psychological coercion and abuse by their rebel captors, are likely to be barred from finding 
relief . . . because of their past ‘support’ of those terrorists, among other statutory bars.”). 
 153. See, e.g., White, supra note 69.
 154. See, e.g., Everett, supra note 11, at 319.
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on unnecessary restrictions such as requiring the group to persecute 
only children.
155
 While it is important to understand and address the 
application of exclusionary bars to child soldiers,
156
 it is equally 
important to ensure that asylum law protects as many former child 
soldiers as is possible. Doing so requires convincing courts to 
recognize an applicant’s particular social group for past persecution. 
 If courts begin to recognize child soldiers as a particular social 
group for the purpose of future persecution, as did the Third Circuit 
in Lukwago, why is it so critical that they recognize a particular 
social group for the purpose of past persecution? First, widely 
available evidence on the realities of how and why groups target 
children supports recognition of certain children as belonging to a 
particular social group of those targeted for exploitation. Second, the 
recognition of children at risk of conscription and former child 
soldiers as definable social groups by international treaties, 
scholarship, and human rights organizations
157
 provides further 
support for acknowledging that such children constitute a cognizable 
and definable social group. Third, not all children will be able to 
prove fear of future persecution, either because of changes in country 
conditions
158
 or because the child may age-out of child status, therein 
weakening a claim that he will be targeted for rerecruitment or 
persecution as a former child soldier.
159
 Until courts recognize and fill 
these gaps in the current law, U.S. law cannot fully protect former 
child soldiers in the asylum process. 
 155. Ruesch, supra note 17, at 194-95 (“[I]f a persecutor persecutes only children on 
account of an enumerated ground, then the former child-soldier arguably has a stronger 
case for a grant of humanitarian asylum.”).
 156. Scholars writing on why child soldiers should not be excluded from asylum by the 
material support and persecutor bars base their arguments on three principles: duress, 
infancy, and incompatibility of exclusion with international and domestic documents 
regarding child soldiers. See, e.g., id. at 198-210; see also Grossman, supra note 44, at 349-
50. Though the reforms scholars propose vary, the core argument is the same: the very fact 
that child soldiers are children demands U.S. asylum law treat them differently and, in 
most cases, not apply exclusionary bars. See, e.g., Ruesch, supra note 17, at 216-18.
 157. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 
25, 2000) available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc-conflict.htm; U.N. Secretary-
General, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. 
S/2002/1299 (Nov. 26, 2002).
 158. Everett, supra note 11, at 319 (Noting that not all children may be able to 
establish a fear of future persecution sufficient to argue that courts should still remain 
open to the prospect of granting asylum in such cases based on past persecution. The 
author, however, provides no guidance has to how to overcome the nexus problem 
illustrated in Lukwago.).
 159. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 171 (3d Cir. 2003).
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IV.  MOVING THE LAW FORWARD
A.  Increasing Protection: The Benefits of Humanitarian Asylum 
 Recall that the Third Circuit found Lukwago’s persecution to be 
“atrocious and severe” and therein sufficient for the threshold 
requirements of humanitarian asylum.
160
 Paired with that Circuit’s 
and the Ninth Circuit’s acknowledgement that a child’s suffering 
may be worse because he is a child,
161
 many child soldiers have a 
strong chance of establishing past persecution which is sufficiently 
severe to make them eligible for humanitarian asylum.
162
 As “[c]hild-
soldiers generally receive little or no protection from their country 
and face substantial threats of deprivation of life or physical 
freedom,” returning to his or her home country may not be a positive 
step for a child.
163
 Humanitarian asylum is, therefore, an ideal option 
for former child soldiers who cannot establish a fear of future 
persecution, because it “offers a potential ticket to freedom to 
applicants who have suffered the most horrific persecution, yet do not 
qualify for asylum under the standard refugee definition.”
164
 No child 
will succeed in getting humanitarian asylum, however, unless courts 
recognize that the child suffered persecution on account of her 
membership in a particular social group.
165
B.  Recognizing the Truth and Filling the Gap: Particular Social 
Group for Past Persecution 
Advancing asylum law to provide better protections for child 
soldiers requires courts recognize this critical truth: groups target 
particular children for characteristics intrinsic to their youth paired 
with other immutable characteristics. As was detailed earlier, 
children appeal to groups that exploit them, among other reasons, 
because of their youth, impressionability, capacity to elude capture, 
and the fact that they require less expense and care than adults.
166
Valuing these characteristics, governments and rebel groups 
 160. Id. at 174.
 161. See id. at 170-71; Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1181, 1193 (9th Cir. 2005).
 162. See Everett, supra note 11, at 319.
 163. Ruesch, supra note 17, at 195 (internal footnote omitted); see also Everett, supra 
note 11, at 319 (arguing that the severity of the persecution children suffer and the fact 
that some children will not be able to establish fear of future persecution requires courts be 
“cognizant of the persecution such children have suffered . . . [and not] den[y] asylum for 
lacking a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).
 164. Rebecca H. Gutner, A Neglected Alternative: Toward a Workable Standard for 
Implementing Humanitarian Asylum, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 413, 450 (2006). 
 165. See, e.g., Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 174. 
 166. For a complete discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 26-37. See also 
SINGER, supra note 20, at 58; WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 2, 37-40.
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systematically target children for conscription.
167
 Furthermore, child 
soldiers fit a profile: they are children in their late preteen to 
midteenage years, who have been either forcibly or by circumstance 
separated from their families and who live in countries where rebel 
groups and/or armies regularly exploit children as child soldiers.
168
Courts must acknowledge these realities and respond accordingly by 
recognizing well-conceived particular social groups for the purposes 
of past persecution.  
 A child soldier applicant’s particular social group for the purpose 
of past persecution will of course vary based upon that child’s 
individual story, but it will share certain unifying characteristics 
with other claims. First, the child will have been separated from his 
or her family, either by orphanage, abduction, or circumstance (e.g. 
wartime upheaval). Second, the child will be somewhere within his 
late preteen to midteenage years at the time of his conscription. 
Third and last, the child will be from a country in which 
international organizations and/or similar country reports show a 
pattern of groups exploiting children as child soldiers. The general 
model of the group can be articulated as follows: children living in 
countries where groups regularly conscript child soldiers, who were 
separated from their families, by force or circumstance, and were in 
their late preteen to midteen years at the time of conscription. The 
applicant must, of course, provide additional, specific details. 
However, if a former child soldier applicant can prove all three of 
these elements and that he or she was ultimately conscripted, a court 
should recognize him or her as belonging to a particular social group 
for the purpose of past persecution, thereby opening the door for the 
protection of humanitarian asylum.  
 Such a construction of a general particular social group meets the 
requirements of emerging case law without falling into the tautology 
rejected by Lukwago. While age is a factor in defining the group, 
there are two additional, perceptible factors that delimit the group, 
thereby satisfying the Second Circuit’s plus-factor requirement for an 
age-based particular social group. Further, by limiting the group to a 
certain age range, the range scholars recognize as being most at-risk 
for conscription,
169
 this construction limits the breadth of the group, 
thereby satisfying courts’ concerns that age-based groups are overly 
broad. Drawing upon the Second Circuit’s precedent in Gao, the 
proposed group definition requires evidence of systematic persecution 
of the group throughout the country.
170
 Therein, the proposed group 
 167. See, e.g., HONWANA, supra note 26, at 44.
 168. For a complete discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 20-25. See also
SINGER, supra note 20, at 29, 62; WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 2, 7, 25.
 169. See WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 7.
 170. Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 70 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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definition requires the applicant to demonstrate the additional 
evidence the Second Circuit required of any age-based group through 
a means sanctioned by the Circuit: a showing of broad-based threat 
to the group due to general country conditions.
171
 This construction 
will inevitably exclude some worthy applicants who do not fit the 
proposed definition. However, its recognition by courts would 
advance the cause of a significant number of child soldier applicants 
and thereby be a positive step forward in the development of asylum 
law in this area. 
 One avenue for this development is legislative amendment of the 
INA to recognize the particular social group here proposed. Congress 
previously amended the definition of refugee in the INA to include 
persons coercively subject to China’s one-child policy.
172
 As one 
scholar, Benjamin Ruesch, notes, that amendment is evidence of 
Congress’s “willing[ness] to act to open the doors of the U.S. to 
certain social groups that suffer various persecutions.”
173
 Building 
upon this foundation, Ruesch argues that Congress should provide 
similar assistance to child soldiers.
174
 Ambitious legislation could 
expressly recognize all former child soldiers as being eligible for their 
asylum and provide for derivative claims for their families.
175
 A more 
conservative amendment could create a rebuttable presumption that 
a former child soldier who can establish the three aspects of the 
proposed particular social group (separation from family, certain age 
range, from a nation in which children are regularly conscripted) is 
eligible for asylum based on past persecution as part of that 
particular social group. Any such amendment could include a 
statutory cap on the number of possible children to be admitted to 
answer potential floodgates concerns.
176
 Though a legislative 
amendment to the INA may be an uphill battle,
177
 child soldier 
advocates should explore this option as a means of increasing 
protection for this much “aggrieved social group.”
178
 171. Id. (“To the extent that the social group of which the petitioner claims to be a 
member is exceptionally broad, the need for the individual to prove that he, in particular, 
reasonably fears being persecuted is certainly greater. This can be done either by showing 
that a significant portion of even the very broad group will be persecuted . . . . [I]t may be 
readily assumed in the circumstances of a particular country that virtually every 
individual in a racial or ethnic group may reasonably fear future persecution, even though 
the group is very large.”).
 172. Ruesch, supra note 17, at 215-16.
 173. Id. at 216.
 174. Id. at 217 (“Congress should amend the INA to include former child-soldiers as 
qualifying refugees seeking asylum.”).
 175. Id. at 213.
 176. Id. at 216.
 177. See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 74 (noting that the INA has only been 
amended once since 1980, to include those subject to population control in China).
 178. Ruesch, supra note 17, at 213, 217.
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C.  Necessarily Conservative: How the Proposed Particular Social 
Group Addresses Courts’ Policy Concerns 
Absent a legislative amendment, courts will have to voluntarily 
recognize the validity of the proposed group for child soldier 
applicants. While the proposed definition addresses previously 
discussed concerns regarding the breadth of age-based particular 
social groups, courts may still be afraid to recognize age-based child 
soldier claims. This reticence may stem from a desire to close the 
door to claims of youths trying to avoid conscription into gangs. 
Gang-related asylum claims have increased in recent years and are 
emerging as “one of the most important areas in asylum law.”
179
 Yet, 
courts hesitate to recognize claims of children seeking asylum to 
avoid having to join gangs, frequently rejecting the applicant’s 
particular social group as being “too broad.”
180
 While a full discussion 
of gang-related claims is beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
important for courts to understand how child soldier claims are 
distinguishable from gang-related claims.  
 On a general level, child soldier and gang-related claims are 
substantively distinguishable. Frequently, the nature of the conflict a 
child is involved in differs if that child is conscripted as a child soldier 
or as a gang member. Though groups like FARC (Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia) confound the distinction,
181
 child soldiers 
will, more often than gang members, be involved in expressly 
political conflicts.
182
 Further, unlike gang members, child soldiers can 
be conscripted either by government or nongovernmental forces.
183
Each of these facts distinguishes child soldier claims from gang-
related claims, thereby reducing the validity of a floodgates 
argument against recognizing age-based child soldier claims. 
 Perhaps most importantly, the proposed particular social group, 
by its very construction, would not be available to children seeking 
asylum to avoid having to join gangs. The proposed social group 
requires a child to have been conscripted. It is the persecution he or 
she suffered as a child soldier that constitutes past persecution for a 
claim of humanitarian asylum. The role of the proposed particular 
social group definition is to ensure that courts will recognize that the 
child applicant was targeted and subsequently persecuted on account 
of her membership in a particular social group, i.e. on account of a 
 179. Matthew J. Lister, Gang-Related Asylum Claims: An Overview and Prescription,
38 U. MEM. L. REV. 827, 828 (2008).
 180. Id. at 840; see also Cruz-Alvarez v. Holder, 320 F. App’x 273, 274 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(“The characteristics of youth and resistance to gang activity are too generalized and do not 
provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the petitioners from other persons.”).
 181. WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 16-17.
 182. Id. at 6.
 183. See id. at 40.
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protected ground. It is not meant to open the door to children who 
have yet to be conscripted but fear future persecution through 
conscription. As such, it does not open the door to children who fear 
they will be forced to join gangs. While such children may have valid 
claims, to recognize all children, conscripted and yet to be 
conscripted, resurrects concerns of the over-breadth of age-based 
claims. Courts are simply not ready to recognize such claims.
184
Accordingly, the proposed definition takes a narrower tack, providing 
protection to a well-defined and smaller set of applicants.  
 The fear of opening the door to gang-based claims through 
recognition of any age-based particular social group is merely a 
specific expression of the oft-cited floodgates argument. In addition to 
the substantive restriction embedded within the language of the 
proposed group definition, practical challenges limit the number of 
child soldiers who could be granted asylum within the U.S. Taken 
together, these substantive and practical limits negate any 
floodgates concerns. 
 Statistics and practical experience illustrate that very few child 
soldiers will reach American shores. On a global scale, as many as 20 
million children live as refugees or are displaced from their homes.
185
If every one of the estimated 300,000 children who live as child 
soldiers were refugees, they would still only constitute 1.5% of the 
overall child refugee population.
186
 In 2008, only 5000 children 
attempted to enter the U.S. without parents or guardians, or .025% of 
the overall child refugee population.
187
 The percentage of those 5000 
children who are likely to have been child soldiers and will make it to 
American shores, while unknown, is likely to be minuscule.
188
Children are, quite practically, unlikely to have the resources 
necessary to flee to the U.S.
189
 On the one hand, these statistics are 
regrettable, as they illustrate the fact that few child soldiers escape 
their persecution and find security and rehabilitative care. On the 
other hand, these statistics argue in favor of providing the greatest 
protection available to those children who are fortunate enough to 
escape their persecution.
190
 There will be no flood of children, no need 
to close our borders to the onslaught. 
 Beyond being limited by the practical challenges of reaching the 
U.S., the substantive provisions of this proposal further limit the 
 184. See, e.g., Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 364 (3d Cir. 2005) (articulating 
concerns that “Honduran street children” do not constitute a sufficiently-tailored particular 
social group); see also Lister, supra note 179, at 840.
 185. Everett, supra note 11, at 287.
 186. See id..
 187. Id. at 288.
 188. See id. at 288, 349; Morris, supra note 17 at 283-84.
 189. See Morris, supra note 17, at 283-84.
 190. Everett, supra note 11, at 349-50.
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number of child soldier applicants who will be eligible for asylum. 
Reports indicate that nongovernment armed forces and governments 
in seventeen conflicts throughout the world actively exploit children 
as child soldiers.
191
 Since 2001 reports document the use of child 
soldiers in twenty-seven different countries.
192
 These numbers, while 
too high, create a delineated space in which persecutors target 
children as child soldiers. Recall that the proposed definition requires 
the child applicant to show, through country reports or similar 
reports from human rights organization, that groups within the 
country of persecution systematically exploit children as child 
soldiers. This substantive requirement, taken with the reality that 
the use of child soldiers is limited to certain countries, means that 
not all children will be able to satisfy the requirement. Thus, in 
tandem, the limitations work to counter arguments that recognizing 
the proposed group definition will open the floodgates to former child 
soldier claims.  
V.  LOST NO LONGER: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
 If the law moves in baby steps, the proposal of this Note moves 
asylum law forward in this vein. There are no calls for a sweeping 
overhaul of particular social group doctrine, no demands that all 
children at risk of conscription or who have suffered as child soldiers 
be automatically granted asylum. In contrast, the proposal is simple: 
In certain conflicts, in a limited number of countries in the world, 
governments and rebel groups target and exploit children because 
they are children. Courts must not turn a blind eye to this reality. 
Rather, they must acknowledge it and respond appropriately by 
recognizing such children belong to a particular social group for the 
purpose of their past persecution. Doing so will enable these children 
to gain the protection of humanitarian asylum, a door to security, 
and the opportunity to prosper in a new country. Until the 
international community succeeds in eradicating the use of child 
soldiers, the best we can hope for is that more children have stories 
like that of Ishmael Beah. Courts’ recognition of the proposed 
particular social group definition would be one small step toward 
achieving that goal.  
 191. COALITION, supra note 14, at 3 (Noting that the use of child soldiers in seventeen 
conflicts as of the beginning of 2008 represents a decrease from their use in twenty-seven 
conflicts as of 2004. However, the report attributes that decrease not to successful efforts to 
combat the use of child soldiers, but rather to the resolution of certain conflicts.). 
 192. WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 11. 
